Java Cards

NXP JCOP 4 Security Target Lite v3.4 7

2020-07-14 16:07:36 M&W SmartCard 2

6       Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)

6.1   Definition of Family ”Audit Data Storage (FAU_SAS)”

This section has been taken over from the certified (BSI-PP-0084-2014) Security IC Platform Protection profile [24].

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

FAU_SAS Audit data storage

Family behavior:

This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.

Component leveling:

NXP JCOP 4 Security Target Lite v3.4 7

6.2   Definition of Family ”TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC)”

This section has been taken over from the certified (BSI-PP-0055) Protection Profile Machine Readable travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control [5].

The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [3].

FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation

Family behavior:

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

Component leveling:

FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation


1







Fig. 6.2: EMSEC ComponentFPT_EMSEC                TOE emanation has two constituents:FPT_EMSEC.1.1           Limit of emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.FPT_EMSEC.1.2           Interface emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or userdata.Management:               FPT_EMSEC.1

There are no management activities foreseen.Audit:                           FPT_EMSEC.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FPT_EMSEC.              TOE Emanation.

Hierarchical to:              No other components.Dependencies              No dependencies.FPT_EMSEC.1.1           The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: speci-

fied limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list

of types of user data].FPT_EMSEC.1.2           The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface

[assignment:type of connection] to gain access to[assignment: list of types of TSF data]

and[assignment: list of types of user data].

7       Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)

This section defines the security requirements for the TOE.

7.1   Definitions

7.1.1 Groups

The requirements are arranged into groups taken from [13]. Further groups are added to cover additional security functional requirements.

Group

Description

Core with Logical Channels

The CoreG_LC contains the requirements concerning the runtime environment of the Java Card System implementing logical channels. This includes the fire- wall policy and the requirements related to the Java Card API. Logical channels are a Java Card specification version 2.2 feature. This group is the union of requirements from the Core (CoreG) and the Logical channels (LCG) groups defined in [29] (cf. Java Card System Protection Profile Collection [30]).

(CoreG_LC)


Installation (InstG)

The InstG contains the security requirements concerning the installation of post- issuance applications.  It does not address card management issues in the broad sense, but only those security aspects of the installation procedure that are related to applet execution.


Applet deletion (ADELG)

The ADELG contains the security requirements for erasing installed applets from the card, a feature introduced in Java Card specification version 2.2.

Remote Method Invocation

The RMIG contains the security requirements for the remote method invocation feature, which provides a new protocol of communication between the terminal and the applets. This was introduced in Java Card specification version 2.2.

(RMIG)


Object deletion (ODELG)

The ODELG contains the security requirements for the object deletion capabil- ity. This provides a safe memory recovering mechanism. This is a Java Card specification version 2.2 feature.


Secure carrier (CarG)

The CarG group contains minimal requirements for secure downloading of ap- plications on the card. This group contains the security requirements for pre- venting, in those configurations that do not support on-card static or dynamic bytecode verification, the installation of a package that has not been bytecode verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification.


External Memory (EMG)

The EMG group contains security requirements for the management of external memory.

Configuration (ConfG)

This group contains security requirements related to the configuration of the TOE.

Secure Box (SecBoxG)

This group contains security requirements to separate the native code executed in the Secure Box environment from the rest of the TOE.

Modular Design (ModDesG)

This group contains security requirements concerning the modular design of the TOE.

Restricted Mode (RMG)

This group contains security requirements concerning restriction of the TOE functionality in case the Attack Counter expires.

Further Security Functional

This group contains further security requirements not covered by the PP [13].

Requirements



Tab. 7.1: Requirement Groups

7.1.2 Subjects

Subjects are active components of the TOE that (essentially) act on the behalf of users. The users of the TOE include people or institutions (like the applet developer, the card issuer, the verification authority), hardware (like the CAD where the card is inserted or the PCD) and software components (like the application packages installed on the card). Some of the users may just be aliases for other users. For instance, the verification authority in charge of the bytecode verification of the applications may be just an alias for the card issuer. Subjects (prefixed with an "S") are described in the following table:

Subject

Description

S.ADEL

The applet deletion manager which also acts on behalf of the card issuer. It may be an applet ([39], §11), but its role asks anyway for a specific treatment from the security viewpoint. This subject is unique and is involved in the ADEL security policy.


S.APPLET

Any applet instance.

S.CAD

The Card Acceptance Device (CAD) represents the actor that requests services by issuing commands to the card. It also plays the role of the off-card entity that communicates with the S.INSTALLER.


S.INSTALLER

The installer is the on-card entity which acts on behalf of the card issuer. This subject is involved in the loading of packages and installation of applets.


S.JCRE

The runtime environment under which Java programs in a smart card are exe- cuted.

S.JCVM

The bytecode interpreter that enforces the firewall at runtime.

S.LOCAL

Operand stack of a JCVM frame, or local variable of a JCVM frame containing an object or an array of references.

S.SD

A GlobalPlatform Security Domain representing on the card a off-card entity. This entity can be the Issuer, an Application Provider, the Controlling Authority or the Verification Authority.


S.MEMBER

Any object’s field, static field or array position.

S.PACKAGE

A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain classes and interfaces, and in the context of Java Card technology, it defines either a user library, or one or several applets.


S.SBNativeCode

The third party native code executed via the Secure Box mechanism.

S.Customer

The subject that has the Customer Configuration Token.

S.NXP

The subject that has the NXP Configuration Token.

S.ConfigurationMechanism

On card entity which can read and write configuration items.


Tab. 7.2: Subject Descriptions

7.1.3 Objects

Objects (prefixed with an "O") are described in the following table:

Objects

Description

O.APPLET

Any installed applet, its code and data.

O.CODE_PKG

The code of a package, including all linking information. On the Java Card platform, a package is the installation unit.

O.JAVAOBJECT

Java class instance or array. It should be noticed that KEYS, PIN, arrays and applet instances are specific objects in the Java programming language.

O.EXT_MEM_INSTANCE

Any External Memory Instance created from the MemoryAccess Interface of the

external package from the Java Card API [38].

O.SB_Content

The code and data elements of the native code library residing in the Secure Box. This includes SecureBox support functionality provided by the TOE, like functionality to write into FLASH memory or execute Crypto Library code.


O.NON_SB_Content

Any code and data elements not assigned to the native code library residing in the Secure Box.

O.SB_SFR

The pool of Special Function Registers assigned to be accessible by native code residing in the Secure Box.

O.NON_SB_SFR

All Special Function Registers which are not assigned to the Secure Box. Es- pecially the Segment Tables to configure the MMU.

O.PUF

The TOE shall provide a PUF functionality that supports sealing/unsealing of user data. Using this functionality, the user data can be sealed within the TOE and can be unsealed by the same TOE that the user data was sealed on. The PUF functionality comprises import/export of data, encryption/decryption of data and calculation of a MAC as a PUF authentication value.


O.CODE_MODULE

Contains Applets, Java code, native code, native code of a library or a com- bination of those. The code of O.CODE_MODULEis called via a dedicated interface. The interface can be TOE internal (if the module implements func- tionality of the JavaCard API) or Public (if the Module implements functionality of the JCOPX API or is accessed via APDUs). Each O.CODE_MODULEhas an unique internal AID.



Tab. 7.3: Object Groups

7.1.4 Informations

Information (prefixed with an "I") is described in the following table:

Information

Description

I.DATA

JCVM Reference Data: objectref addresses of APDU buffer, JCRE-owned in- stances of APDU class and byte array for install method.

I.MODULE_INVOCATION

Code execution flow when invoking code inside O.CODE_MODULE.


Tab. 7.4: Information Groups

7.1.5 Security Attributes

Security attributes linked to the subjects, objects and information are described in the following table:

Security attributes

Description

Active Applets

The set of the active applets’ AIDs. An active applet is an applet that is selected on at least one of the logical channels.

Applet Selection Status

”Selected” or ”Deselected”.

Applet’s Version Number

The version number of an applet (package) indicated in the export file.

Attack Counter

The Attack Counter is triggered when a potential attack is detected. When the Attack Counter reaches its limit, the card moves into restricted mode.

Context

Package AID or ”Java Card RE ”.

Currently Active Context

Package AID or ”Java Card RE”.

Dependent Package AID

Allows the retrieval of the Package AID and applet’s version number.

LC Selection Status

Multiselectable, Non-multiselectable or ”None”.

LifeTime

CLEAR_ON_DESELECT or PERSISTENT. 1.

1Transient objects of type CLEAR_ON_RESET behave like persistent objects in that they can be accessed only when the Currently Active

Owner

The Owner of an object is either the applet instance that created the object or the package (library) where it has been defined (these latter objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of the package). The owner of a remote object is the applet instance that created the object.


Package AID

The AID of each package indicated in the export file or the internal AID of a Module.

Registered Applets

The set of AID of the applet instances registered on the card.

Resident Packages

The set of AIDs of the packages already loaded on the card.

Selected Applet Context

Package AID or ”None”.

Sharing

Standards, SIO, Java Card RE Entry Point or global array.

Static References

Static fields of a package may contain references to objects. The Static Refer- ences attribute records those references.

Address Space

Accessible memory portion.

Customer Configuration Token generation key

The customer key to generate tokens for product configuration.

NXP Configuration Token

The NXP key to generate tokens for product configuration.

generation key


Configuration Token verification key

The keys to verify tokens for product configuration.

NXP Configuration Access

The NXP Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.

Customer Configuration Access

The Customer Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.

access privilege

For each configuration item the access privilege attribute defines who (Cus- tomer and/or NXP) is allowed to read/write the item.

Key Set

Key Set for Secure Channel.

Security Level

Secure Communication Security Level defined in Section 10.6 of [37].

Secure Channel Protocol

Secure Channel Protocol version used.

Session Key

Secure Channel’s session key.

Sequence Counter

Secure Channel Session’s Sequence Counter.

Initial Chaining Vector (ICV)

Secure Channel Session’s ICV.

Card Life Cycle

defined in Section 5.1.1 of [37].

Privileges

defined in Section 6.6.1 of [37].

Life-cycle Status

defined in Section 5.3.2 of [37].

CPU Mode

The execution mode of the CPU. Can be either user mode, system mode or firmware mode.

MMU Segment Table

Defines the memory areas which can be accessed for read / write operations or code execution if the CPU is in user mode. Further defines which of the Special Function Registers of the hardware can be accessed in user mode.


Special Function Registers

Special Function Registers allow to set operation modes of functional blocks of the hardware.

Module Presence

Presence of a particular O.CODE_MODULE inside the TOE with the values ”present” or ”not present”.

Resident Modules

The set of AIDs of the Modules already present in the card.


Tab. 7.5: Security attribute description

7.1.6 Operations

Operations (prefixed with "OP") are described in the following table. Each operation has parameters given be-tween brackets, among which there is the "accessed object", the first one, when applicable. Parameters may be seen as security attributes that are under the control of the subject performing the operation.

Operations

Description

OP.ARRAY_ACCESS

Read/Write an array component.

(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)


OP.ARRAY_LENGTH

Get length of an array component.

(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)


OP.ARRAY_AASTORE

Store into reference array component.

(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)


OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*) 2

Creation of an object (new or makeTransient call).

OP.DELETE_APPLET

Delete an installed applet and its objects, either logically or physically.

(O.APPLET,...)


OP.DELETE_PCKG

Delete a package, either logically or physically.

(O.Code_PKG,...)


OP.DELETE_PCKG_APPLET

Delete a package and its installed applets, either logically or physically.

(O.Code_PKG,...)


OP.INSTANCE_FIELD

Read/Write a field of an instance of a class in the Java programminglanguage.

(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)

OP.INVK_VIRTUAL

Invoke a virtual method (either on a class instance or an array object).

(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1,...)


OP.INVK_INTERFACE

Invoke an interface method.

(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1,...)


OP.JAVA(...)

Any access in the sense of [39], §6.2.8. It stands for one of the opera-tions OP.ARRAY_ACCESS, OP.INSTANCE_FIELD, OP.INVK_VIRTUAL,OP.INVK_INTERFACE, OP.THROW, OP.TYPE_ACCESS, OP.ARRAY_LENGTH.


2For this operation, there is no accessed object. This rule enforces that shareable transient objects are not allowed. For instance, during the creation of an object, the JavaCardClass attribute’s value is chosen by the creator.

OP.PUT(S1, S2, I)

Transfer a piece of information I from S1 to S2.

OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)

Throwing of an object (athrow, see [39], §6.2.8.7).

OP.TYPE_ACCESS

Invoke checkcast or instanceof on an object in order to access to classes

(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)

(standard or shareable interfaces objects).

OP.CREATE_EXT_MEM_IN-

Creation of an instance supporting the MemoryAccess Interface.

STANCE


OP.READ_EXT_MEM (O.EXT_

Reading the external memory represented by O.EXT_MEM_INSTANCE.

MEM_IN STANCE, address)


OP.WRITE_EXT_MEM (O.EXT_

Writing the external memory represented by O.EXT_MEM_INSTANCE.

MEM_IN STANCE, address)


OP.SB_ACCESS

Any read, write or execution access to a memory area.

OP.SB_ACCESS_SFR

Any read/write access to a Special Function Register.

OP.INVOKE_MODULE

Invocation of an O.CODE_MODULE. The invocation of the code is trans-parent to the user. In case O.CODE_MODULE has a TOE internal in-terface and is not present in the TOE, a secure state is preserved by

throwing an exception or sending an appropriate error status word to the CAD.


OP.DELETE_MODULE

Deletion of a Module.

Tab. 7.6: Operation Description

9    Contents

1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT)

1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference

1.2 TOE Overview


1.2.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE

1.2.2 TOE Type

1.2.3 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware

1.3 TOE Description


1.3.1 TOE Components and Composite Certi fication

1.3.2 Optional TOE Functionality

1.3.3 TOE Life Cycle

1.3.4 TOE Identification

1.3.5 Evaluated Package Types


2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)


2.1 CC Conformance Claim

2.2 Package Claim

2.3 PP Claim

2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale


2.4.1 TOE Type

2.4.2 SPD Statement

2.4.3 Security Objectives Statement

2.4.4 Security Functional Requirements State ment

3 Security Aspects


3.1 Confidentiality

3.2 Integrity

3.3 Unauthorized Executions

3.4 Bytecode Verification

3.5 Card Management

3.6 Services

3.7 External Memory

3.8 Configuration Module

3.9 Modular Design

3.10 Restricted Mode

4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)


4.1 Assets


4.1.1 User Data

4.1.2 TSF Data

4.2 Threats


4.2.1 Confidentiality

4.2.2 Integrity

4.2.3 Identity Usurpation

4.2.4 Unauthorized Execution

4.2.5 Denial of Service

4.2.6 Card Management

4.2.7 Services

4.2.8 Miscellaneous

4.2.9 Operating System

4.2.10 Random Numbers

4.2.11 Configuration Module

4.2.12 Secure Box

4.2.13 Module replacement

4.2.14 Restricted Mode

4.3 Organisational Security Policies

4.4 Assumptions

5 Security Objectives


5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE


5.1.1 Identification

5.1.2 Execution

5.1.3 Services

5.1.4 Object Deletion

5.1.5 Applet Management

5.1.6 External Memory

5.1.7 Card Management

5.1.8 Smart Card Platform

5.1.9 Secure Box

5.1.10 Random Numbers

5.1.11 Configuration Module

5.1.12 Restricted Mode

5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

5.3 Security Objectives Rationale


5.3.1 Threats

5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies

5.3.3 Assumptions


6 Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)


6.1 Definition of Family ”Audit Data Storage (FAU_SAS)”

6.2 Definition of Family ”TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC)”

7 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)


7.1 Definitions


7.1.1 Groups

7.1.2 Subjects

7.1.3 Objects

7.1.4 Informations

7.1.5 Security Attributes

7.1.6 Operations

7.2 Security Functional Requirements


7.2.1 COREG_LC Security Functional Requirements

7.2.2 INSTG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.3 ADELG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.4 RMIG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.5 ODELG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.6 CarG Security Functional Requirements .

7.2.7 EMG Security Functional Requirements .

7.2.8 ConfG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.9 SecBoxG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.10 ModDesG Security Functional Requirements

7.2.11 RMG Security Functional Requirements .

7.2.12 Further Security Functional Requirements

7.3 Security Assurance Requirements

7.4 Security Requirements Rationale for the TOE


7.4.1 Identification

7.4.2 Execution

7.4.3 Services

7.4.4 Object Deletion

7.4.5 Applet Management

7.4.6 External Memory

7.4.7 Card Management

7.4.8 Smart Card Platform

7.4.9 Random Numbers

7.4.10 Configuration Module

7.4.11 Secure Box

7.4.12 Restricted Mode

7.5 SFR Dependencies


7.5.1 Rationale for Exclusion of Dependencies


7.6 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)


8.1 Introduction

8.2 Security Functionality

8.3 Protection against Interference and Logical Tampering

8.4 Protection against Bypass of Security Related Actions

9 Contents

10 Glossary

11 Acronyms

12 Bibliography

13 Legal information


13.1 Definitions

13.2 Disclaimers

13.3 Licenses

13.4 Patents

13.5 Trademarks

Java Card is an open standard from Sun Microsystems for a smart card developmentplatform. Smart cards created using the Java Card platform have Java applets stored on them. The applets can be added to or changed after the card is issued.

There are two basic types of smart cards. The memory smart card is the familiar removable memory device; it usually features read and write capabilities and perhaps security features. The more complex version, the processor smart card, is a very small and extremely portable computing device that could be carried in your wallet. Java-based smart cards belong to the latter category. They store data on an integrated microprocessor chip. Applets are loaded into the memory of the microprocessor and run by the Java Virtual Machine. Similarly to MULTOS, another smart card development technology, Java Card enables multiple application programs to be installed and coexist independently. Individual applets are protected by a firewall to preserve their integrity and prevent tampering. Applications can be updated dynamically.

In the United States, the Department of Defense, Visa, and American Express are among the organizations creating Java Card-based applications.


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